Sunday, April 23, 2006

Bridging the Troubled Waters Between Vietnam and Iraq?

Applying Half-Assed Ruminations About History and Historical Analogies...

Historical analogies deserve a certain skepticism. They represent the artifice of simplifications intended to deepen our understanding of events which are unfolding before our eyes, as -maybe - we imagine future historians will explain our present to our progeny. In order to highlight certain threads of history, they are defensible as long as we remember they are simplifications, and not at all to be considered above suspicion.

In fact, simplistic historical analogies can become quite malevolent in their effects on policy.

Consider, for example, the meticulously careful and conservative lessons drawn by George Kennan as he drafted his doctrine of Containment of the Soviet Union. He was drawing from the disastrous consequences of the Munich syndrome - appeasement of totalitarian states in Europe. His writing served Truman and subsequent American presidents well as they negotiated through the years of the Cold War.

Contrast Kennan's craft with the misconceptions of Dean Rusk and the rest of JFK's "Best and the Brightest" as they greedily snatched up the reins dropped by the French in South East Asia. Vietnam looked like a repeat of Korea. (However, the Sigman Rhee (George Washington) of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, was ensconced in the North).

And, as I thought at the time, Rusk's State Department even thought Vietnam looked a little like the pre-Franco Spanish Civil War in the 30's [into which Hitler had dipped his hands], and needed to be bolstered up, else it fall like the dominoes of Eastern Europe under Nazism. (Are you beginning to get the sense of how historical analogies can jerk you around?)

But instead, SE Asia turned out to be quite different than SE Europe, huh? It turned out that to the local inhabitants (never consulted), totalitarianism wasn't such a big deal as was nationalism. Had that thought struck Rusk, might he have not seen the French Indo-Chinese syndrome as a variant of the French-Algeria syndrome? But Rusk was an errant heir, driven to see that JFK inherited Saigon from the French, and that LBJ inherited the same from JFK. Had not Indochina been so polarized with such a bloodletting, Ho could have emerged as an Asian Tito: communist, but non-aligned. (Actually, he did.)


By now, you can tell where I'm going with this.

Since Bush announced his mission accomplished there has been too much spilled ink and torn paper about similarities and dissimilarities between Vietnam and Iraq not to insert a caveat at this point: this is a working paper and I fully intend to accommodate, by editing, some of the comment it attracts. With that said, here goes:

  1. Casus Belli: LBJ’s decision to augment a detachment of American advisors in Vietnam with troops was the result of a fraudulent allegation that the Vietnamese Navy had attacked an American destroyer in the Gulf of Tomkin. As we learned later through the Downing Street Memo, GWB attempted something of the same nature: painting American war planes with U.N. insignia and sending them over Iraq in sorties designed to draw anti-aircraft fire. In the end, Bush and Cheney stampeded our country into war in the post-9/11 hysteria and on the pretense that Saddam’s dictatorship had weapons of mass destruction and was associated with al Qaeda.

  2. Origins: In Vietnam, JFK and LBJ serially inherited a half-completed war of national liberation against the French and turned it into a sectional (north-south) Vietnamese civil war, while all the time managing to call it a case of international aggression. In Iraq, GWB impulsively re-ignited a half-completed war (halted a dozen years prior) with a cold-blooded invasion, followed by an unplanned occupation resulting in a civil war, the warnings of which had been ignored.

  3. Legitimacy of War Time Presidents: Presidents with dubious personal mandates waged both bloody fiascoes. LBJ became president by way of assassination, GWB by way of a 5-4 decision of the Supreme Court after having lost the popular vote to an opponent vastly more qualified.

  4. Length: The Vietnam war lasted twice as long as the Iraq war, but the latter quagmire is still counting days, months, and years.

  5. Escalations: The Vietnam war escalated in terms of external air strikes against North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; GWB's adventure has threatened/is threatening to spillover into Syria and Iran.

  6. Regional Instabilities: Nixon’s politically destabilizing of Cambodia resulted in the Khmer Rouge and genocide. In Iraq, a separatist Kurdistan could result in ethnic cleansing battles with the Turks.

  7. Dominoes: Vietnam was basically sold as a domino, which had to be held up else others in South East Asia, would fall. The Iraq misadventure metamorphosed in terms of mission creep. It was originally sold as a war to prevent an attack of weapons of mass destruction, which were often undefined. Its mission crept up to include al Qaeda, regime-change, a democratization of Iraq, and a domino process throughout the Middle East. So, in Vietnam, the domino theorizing initiated the project; in the latter case of Iraq, domino-izing was thrown in when other casus belli proved to be too leaky to hold water.

  8. KIA's & MIA's: The death toll in Iraq remains well short of Vietnam's numbers. The wounded-in-action statistics of both wars were marked by 'improvements' in the technology of emergency medical care: more soldiers survived with critical, life modifying wounds. This means that one of the hidden costs of Iraq will be the continuing costs of lifetime medical care, psychological trauma and occupational support of veterans.

  9. Draft/No Draft: There's no draft at this point in Iraquagmire. The Vietnam effort required drafting of an increasingly reluctant civilian military, susceptible to declining morale and political support. In Iraq, the invasion was carried out by a professional military that was supplemented by hired mercenaries in the subsequent occupation. In the latter case, the military has been able to reduce desertion rates to a trickle by offering the carrot of benefits rather than the stick of incarceration. However, also in the case of the case of Iraq, the need for boots on the ground has required the mis-use of personnel for ground combat: the elevation of the National Guard units; the use of support personnel for ground combat; and the stop-loss process of overuse of certain personnel.

  10. Combat: In Vietnam, our opponents were known colloquially as the Vietcong, but were indistinguishable from the People's Army of Viet-Nam (PAVN). Warfare was initially asymmetrical guerilla-counter guerilla warfare and evolved towards the use of air power and armor on both sides. Our enemy was a single ideology-driven nationalist group operating from a known secure base. They were supported by two members of the nuclear club (who weren't themselves that friendly.) Our Iraqi adversaries are multiple and shadowy: insurgents, terrorists and street criminals sponsored by Baathist 'dead-enders', foreign terrorist 'beheaders', and indigenous militias with no secure terriorial sanctuary. Warfare has evolved from the conventional battle between two standing, formally structured militaries to entirely an asymmetrical insurgency-counterinsurgency hostility in which pitched battles are rare. Whether our adversaries have possession of secure bases of operations is not a settled issue: Shiite militias (not united among themselves) are said to be supported from Iran, a future nuclear power; Sunni insurgents are suspected to be supported through patrons throughout the Middle East, traversing through Syria and Jordan.

  11. Terrain: The United States had to resort to napalm and Agent Orange to deal with the concealment their jungle offered the VC. In Iraq, the mere scent of white phosphorous in a dramatically more urban theater was spontaneously and universally condemned. Also, it has been argued that the urban warfare in Iraq has rendered the maintenance and repair of national infrastructures a larger issue than it was in South Vietnam. However, in both cases, infrastructure and economies suffered greatly. The net effect was that America had to destroy these theaters in order to save them.

  12. Guns and Butter on the Home Front: During LBJ’s presidency we had an attempt to unify the country through the War on Poverty and the Great Society; nowadays, we have the 'Compassionate Conservatives' waging a war against the middle class through wartime tax relief for the rich.

  13. Opposition: In the case of Vietnam, protests increased as the war went on. The Iraqi war was the first war in which the largest protests occurred before the American invasion which had been telegraphed for a year or more.

  14. Loyalist Reaction to Dissent: The same phraseology has been used in both cases: there’s light at the end of the tunnel, and the need to see it through and settle for nothing less than complete victory and more fighting and sacrifice and winning hearts and minds. These expressions give us more than twinges of deja vue.

  15. The Vietnam-Iraqi Syndrome(s): In both cases, the double-edged sword of a historical blame game is played. The military blames their civilian leadership for sending troops to their deaths without deploying sufficient forces at the same time micro-managing them from afar. The other side of the syndrome is the liberal democratic complaint: don’t send our servicemen out into foreign lands unless you are prepared for us to talk about what they are doing and why they are there.
There you have it: a working list of the comparisons of the Two Vietnams or of the Two Iraqs, however you want to think of it. They are not identical, but definitely they are the fraternal twins of American self-delusion.

Update (21-May-06): I have just fallen upon comments of a historian who has lived through both 'twins'. From his blog, History Unfolding, here are David Kaiser's 'money' conclusions:
What got me thinking, however, as one old enough to remember these events vividly, was the obvious, deep division between the leadership of the Administration on the one hand and the Congress and opinion leaders on the other. After the very heavy fighting of 1968 (which was not confined to the Tet offensive, but continued through the year), the bulk of Americans had concluded that we were not going to achieve our original objectives. Nixon had not. And so began a tradition that has persisted, off and on, for 36 years: that of an Administration more or less secretly pursuing a policy in which the American public does not believe, because it has convinced itself that such a policy is necessary and dissenters are simply playing politics, showing naivete, or working against their own country.

Something similar certainly seems to be happening today. President Bush and Secretary Rice remain totally committed to their idea of a democratic, pluralistic, relatively secular Iraq, despite the lack of any evidence that such an outcome is getting nearer. (It is not clear, on the other hand, that Vice President Cheney or Secretary Rumsfeld, the other major powers in the Administration, have ever cared much about the future of Iraq once Saddam was gone.) Realism in 1970 would have involved agreeing to a coalition government or acknowledged partition in South Vietnam, allowing the troops to come home, the American defense establishment to rebuild (clearly, based on the new documents, the main concern of Defense Secretary Laird), and the people of Vietnam at least to live in peace. A great deal of suffering might have been avoided, and it is possible that Communists would not have taken power in Laos (whose Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma told Nixon in the spring of 1970 that a coalition government was the answer in South Vietnam) or in Cambodia, where the Khmer Rouge were not yet a significant factor. Realism today, in all probability, would involve recognizing that Iraq is almost certain to fracture into three parts, and trying to start negotiations to make that process as painless as possible. But within the Green Zone, the American authorities still seem committed to the vision of impartial security forces, disarmed militias, and law-abiding Iraqis. Events seem be happening on two entirely different planes. And it seems, as under Nixon, that no one can serve in the upper reaches of this Administration who does not officially believe in the happy ending to come. (A Washington Post article indicates that some American military officers are advocating partition, but they appear to be in a minority and do not yet include anyone of high rank. (See Washington Post)

Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld apparently believed Saddam had to be eliminated, and did not much care about the consequences. Regime change--or rather, regime elimination--was the sum and substance of their policy. They seem to be, essentially, conventional military thinkers who are only intermittently interested in broader political trends. (Rumsfeld's leaked memo in 2003 or 2004, I believe, was one example of momentary interest.) And now they are fixated on Iran, which is more of a conventional threat than Iraq was. Nixon reacted to stalemate in Vietnam by opening a new front in Cambodia--one that ended even more disastrously--and deepening our involvement in Laos. When South Vietnam fell in 1975, Kissinger, now under Gerald Ford, reacted by trying to get the United States involved in a civil war in Angola to show we had not lost our will. If the Congress wants to stop an air campaign against Iran, it had better move pre-emptively to do so.
I'll digest this later!

11 Moderated Comments:

Blogger Beach Bum said...

Hey Dude,
Excuse me if I'm wrong. But what I get is that the highly educated idiots at Foggy Bottom can't see the forest for the trees at times, especially when certain elected officals want to make things look a certain way. While patterns in history are a nice way to try and make sense of geo-politcal affairs they are largely illusions and to try and plan your respones to current events by what happened in the past can get you in a world of hurt. That is at least my take on what you wrote. I look forward to reading the rest of your essay when you post it.

4/16/2006 05:54:00 PM  
Blogger Malfrat said...

Why didn't the younger of the two twins learn from the older?

4/25/2006 08:08:00 AM  
Blogger Vigilante said...

That's the key question. Iraquagmire followed Viet-quagmire.

The problem is that there were two polar opposite myths left for future generations to use as yardsticks. Two 'Vietnam syndromes'.

That will follow Iraq, too, unresolved for our children's understanding.

There was a place in the 60's where all the points - for and against the war - had been made, formalized, and formula-ized (over and over). Still nothing happened except a few assassinations and a Republican escalation and 58,000 (eventuially) KIA's. Eventually "stay the course" lost out to "change course". We want to maintain the Vigil while this happens again. It's our obligation to our fellow countrymen, who still live inside their bubbles.

5/02/2006 08:42:00 PM  
Anonymous Malfrag said...

Here's a difference between Vietnam I and Vietnam II (Iraq):

LBJ increasingly admitted the error of his policies, and took himself out of the game as far as a 2nd term. Not so GWB who wants not only a 2nd full term, but aspires to propagate his legacy even longer than a 3rd term. As Senator Biden said in last Sunday's NYT:

It is increasingly clear that President Bush does not have a strategy for victory in Iraq. Rather, he hopes to prevent defeat and pass the problem along to his successor.

5/03/2006 12:57:00 PM  
Blogger Malfrat said...

Vietnam had its My Lai; Iraq has its Haditha.

Congressman Jack Murtha has accepted the story that US Marines shot civilians down in cold blood in the western Iraqi town of Haditha.

Lance Cpl. Miguel Terrazas, 20, was killed in the early morning of Nov. 19, 2005, by a roadside explosive device. In the hours that followed, Marines searched three houses, killing a total of 23 people.

The Marine Corps' initial report claimed that 15 civilians had died in the same blast that killed Terrazas -- and another eight insurgents were killed after a subsequent firefight with Marines. Murtha says,

There was no firefight. There was no IED that killed these people.

Our troops overreacted because of the pressure on them, and they killed innocent civilians in cold blood. This is going to be a very, very bad thing for the United States.

Salon

5/18/2006 07:47:00 AM  
Blogger Vigilante said...

Ron Briley The Vietnam War and Modern Memory:


....The right-wing political message is that to question the Iraq War is equivalent to the dissent of the Vietnam era which undermined our troops. Accordingly, to engage in the constitutional right of dissent becomes tantamount to treason.

But as David Zeiger reminds us in Sir! No Sir!, this reading of the Vietnam War ignores the reality of protest during the 1960s. Rather than the antiwar movement standing in opposition to soldiers, many Vietnam veterans were active in questioning the war and American foreign policy. This memory was, of course, resurrected by the presidential candidacy of John Kerry, who was decorated for his service in Vietnam. Kerry also played an important role in the formation of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War as well as the Winter Soldier testimony which documented how the Vietnam War led to atrocities committed against the Vietnamese people and contributed to the degradation of American soldiers. These are memories of the Vietnam conflict which the political right sought to suppress with the infamous Swift Boat campaign attacking Kerry’s military record.

The image of war protesters spitting upon returning soldiers is also employed to discredit critics of the Iraq War. The message is that this time we must not fail the troops. In his book The Spitting Image, professor Jerry Lembecke argues that the spat-upon returning soldier is essentially an urban myth perpetuated by American popular culture. Lembecke was unable to document any such incidents to support this conventional wisdom surrounding how returning Vietnam veterans were received. The spitting image, however, is enunciated in such influential Hollywood films as the Rambo series featuring Sylvester Stallone.

Sir! No Sir! also forces viewers to reconsider one of the political right’s favorite images of the Vietnam War: Jane Fonda as “Hanoi Jane” fraternizing with the enemy and betraying the troops. On the other hand, Fonda’s antiwar spoof of the Bob Hope U.S.O. shows, entitled Free the Army in its most benign nomenclature and featuring such Hollywood celebrities as Donald Sutherland and Peter Boyle, drew thousands of soldiers to concerts at off-base venues during the Vietnam War. This image of Jane Fonda has been virtually erased from public memory in an orchestrated effort to drive a wedge between the troops and antiwar movement. In fact, Fonda got much closer to the front lines and military during the Vietnam War than such architects of the Iraq War as Karl Rove, Dick Cheney, and even George W. Bush. Rather than discussing the contested image of Fonda, perhaps the real memory from the Vietnam era we should be focusing upon is how these men avoided service.

Thousands of Americans and millions of Vietnamese perished in the Vietnam War, yet today Donald Rumsfeld visits Vietnam and proposes military cooperation to counter Chinese expansionism. In the 1980s, Rumsfeld visited Iraq and embraced Saddam Hussein who was then an American ally against Iranian expansionism. Sometimes it seems the enemy in Orwellian fashion shift from Eurasia to Eastasia. George Orwell was right, the one who controls the present controls the past. The memory of the Vietnam War is manipulated to limit dissent and foster support for another questionable war—this time in Iraq. David Zeiger’s Sir! No Sir! is a useful antidote to our selective memory and deserves a wider audience.

6/30/2006 12:13:00 AM  
Blogger Vigilante said...

Follow the link to read this masterpiece after you skim my excerpts from Judith Coburn's Failed American Policies Rise From The Grave In Iraq War:

. . . . Comparisons to Vietnam and terms from that era like "quagmire," "hearts and minds" and "body counts" swamped the media the moment the invasion of Iraq began in March 2003, but Vietnamization didn't make it into the mix until November. Then, the White House, which initially shied off anything linked to Vietnam, started a media campaign to roll out what it was calling "Iraqification," perhaps as an answer to critics who doubted the "mission" had actually been "accomplished" and feared there was no "light at the end of the (Iraqi) tunnel." But the term was quickly dropped.

It seems, however, that there is no way of keeping failed Washington policies in their graves once the dead of night strikes. I was amazed when, in 2005, in Foreign Affairs magazine, Melvin Laird resurrected a claim that his Vietnamization policy had actually worked and plugged for Iraqification of the war there.

. . . . it's distinctly been flashback city for me ever since. One of the great, failed, unspeakably cynical, blood-drenched policies of the Vietnam era, whose carnage I witnessed as a reporter in Cambodia and Vietnam, was being dusted off for our latest disaster of an imperial war. Some kind of brutal regression was upon us. It was the return of the repressed or reverse evolution. . .

. . . . (As it happened, the Vietnam War lacked a speech-writerly slogan like President Bush's, "As Iraqis stand up, we will stand down," but the policy was the same.)

. . . . With the announcement that more American troops were being rushed to Baghdad to put a brake on the fast-developing civil war in the capital, we may be seeing a new twist on the old theme of Vietnamization -- Americans may increase the use of air power in Anbar province and elsewhere in the heartland of the Sunni insurgency as a substitute for troops reassigned to Baghdad. As I saw in Indochina, however, air operations rarely succeed anywhere as a substitute for crack ground troops. They can kill enormous numbers of people without significantly tipping the military balance.

Key to whatever new strategy does exist is the Bush administration's stumbling, fumbling, already bloody Iraqification policy intended to stand up a national army. Our media dutifully passes on the administration's impressive stats on new troops and police trained. Critics insist those troops are ill-equipped and badly trained.

I remember identical glowing reports on American-trained troops in South Vietnam in the early 1970s. Unfortunately, deeper questions about the effectiveness of proxy armies are almost never explored. How do you really get them to do your bidding? How do you even make them believe that what they are doing is for them and not for you?

. . . . By 1970, a majority of Americans thought the Vietnam War was a mistake. Almost exactly the same percentage now feels the same about Iraq. Back then, the White House clung for dear life to Vietnamization while Congress dithered. Now, the same holds true. Even the language -- "Cut and Run," "Stay the Course" -- remains largely the same, as the repetitive bankruptcy of the enterprise deadens even our linguistic life. As then, so now, the complications on the ground in Iraq seem insurmountable from the point of view of an administration and a Congress intent on maintaining what in the Vietnam era was called "credibility" and now has no name at all. . .

Every now and then, as yet another grim Vietnam déjà vu rockets by me, I think back to Sen. George Aiken, the flinty moderate Republican from Vermont (the John Murtha of that time), who, tiring in 1966 of endless hand-wringing from his colleagues about how to get out of Vietnam, told the assembled solons one day that it wasn't hard. All we had to do was declare victory, Aiken said, and fly the troops home. That would have been real Vietnamization.

8/13/2006 09:56:00 AM  
Blogger Vigilante said...

Marie Cocco, comes up with a good point, writing in Truthdig:
. . . . The political origins of the conflicts were fundamentally different, as was the opposition that grew up around them.

American involvement in Vietnam was not the result of some newfangled doctrine cooked up by a small but influential group of partisan insiders. It was, at the start, a logical extension of the policy of containment—that the United States would deter what it saw as the global march of Soviet-style communism anywhere in the world. The notion of containment was bipartisan, had broad support among the public and was unquestioned for decades after World War II.

Containment was pursued through the Vietnam era by Democrat Harry Truman, Republican Dwight Eisenhower and Democrat John F. Kennedy, then by Democrat Lyndon B. Johnson and Republican Nixon. Bush can claim no such history of consensus or bipartisanship on Iraq.

The consensus about Iraq, when the administration was first hatching the idea of an invasion to topple Saddam Hussein, was that United Nations sanctions had worked to prevent the Iraqi dictator from enhancing his military capability. Secretary of State Colin Powell said so, publicly and repeatedly, through much of 2001. So did then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. Most famously, so did Vice President Dick Cheney: “Saddam Hussein’s bottled up,’’ he declared during a Sept. 16, 2001, interview on “Meet the Press.’’

Containment was the world’s policy toward Iraq. Bush disrupted it with his new doctrine of preemptive war. The new policy shattered a long-standing, bipartisan consensus in Washington on the use of American military force. The soft-on-terrorism smear that Bush then used in 2002 against any Democrat who disagreed, however minutely, with any aspect of the Bush war policies deepened the divide. . . .

8/15/2006 05:52:00 AM  
Anonymous Coleen Rowley said...

Great blog, Mr. Vigilante. Great minds think alike someone once said. I have just found your blog and see your great insights on Vietnam-Iraq parallels as well as our very shared goals—most recently I was unsuccessful in running for U.S. Congress in Minnesota against John Kline, a retired Marine Colonel-Vietnam veteran who seemingly suffers greatly (like John McCain and others), from effects of “Vietnam Syndrome”. As a result, he’s currently become one of the biggest Iraq war-hawks (see Kline’s speech in House 2/13/07--http://www.startribune.com/587/story/1001622.html. I think it would be interesting to expose and critique the psychology at play here which you’ve already done so well in this overview. If you’d be interested in co-authoring something further, please contact me via my old campaign website: coleen@coleenrowley.com. Thanks so much for considering.

2/14/2007 01:45:00 PM  
Blogger Flimsy Sanity said...

That really was a good comparison.

Small point: Both wars also inflated their effectiveness by calling every killed person an enemy (either Viet Cong or Al Queda) when there is no way to identify them as combatant or just a native in the wrong place.

When the Bush Republicans put on purple band-aids to ridicule Kerry, I thought that pretty much said what they really thought of veterans.

9/11/2007 12:19:00 PM  
Anonymous Caleb Cambee said...

: Wow, what a good article. There’s been a lot of debate over the similarities between Vietnam and Iraq and I think one thing in common that can’t be debated are the soldiers need to get out what is really going on. I just saw this documentary Sir! No Sir! which is about the G.I. movement during Vietnam and how they made underground newspapers about what was really going on. It reminded me of the soldiers in Iraq blogging about their experiences. We can always depend on the human desire to speak freely. Here’s their site for more info , it’s pretty interesting.

12/14/2007 11:08:00 AM  

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